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NOTES.
LAw SCHOOL-DEATH OF DAvID Rey.s HENItY--On the eve
of graduating from the Law School, David Reeves Henry, a member of the Third-year Class, and an Associate Editor of the LAw
REVIEW, succumbed to an attack of typhoid fever on May 14, 1916,
at his home at St. Martin's, Philadelphia. Within another week he
would have entered itpon his findl examination, he would have
taken the examinations for admission to the Philadelphia Bar in July,
and would have been admitted to the practice of the law in the fall.
His unexpected death cut short an unusually promising career at its'
very beginning.
David Reeves Henry was born in Philadelphia on July7, J892,the
son of John Jackson Henry and Clara Reeves. He received his early
education at Chestnut Hill Academy and Haverford School, Philadelphia. He entered Princeton University in 19o9, and graduated
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four years later.with the degree of Bachelor of Arts. Ie entered
the Law School in September, 1913, where he gave early promise of
success in the-'tudy of the law. He was elected a member of the
Sharswood Law Club and the Phi Delta Phi Legal Fraternity, and at
the end of his second year, was elected by the Faculty to the Editorial
Staff of the LAW REvIEw. Up until almost the day of his death he
was an enthusiastic worker in all the phases of his student-life. So
sudden was his departure that even this issue of the book he helped
to edit contains an article from his pen.
In all his work, both in the class room and among his fellowstudents, he had won for himself a place of marked distinction. He
was gifted with an unusual quickness of perception combined with a
clearness of thought that enabled him to do well everything he undertook. This, together with a faculty for persistent and tireless effort,
insured him a high place in the profession. His death has deprived
the Law School of an alumnus and friend to which it could well have

pointed with pride; the profession has been denied numbering among
its members one who would have toiled untiringly and productively
in its advancement.

COMMON L4,W-EFFECT OF THE ADOPTION r;Y AN AMERICAN
STATE OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGL.ND--The courts of a number

of American jurisdictions, in the absence of statutes on the subject,
have held that the rules of the common law of England, in so far
as they .are applicable and are not in conflict with express statutory
enactment, are in full force today.' In the majority of American
States, however, special statutes have adopted the English common
law, so far as it is consistent with and adapted to the necessities
of the people and is not repugnant to or inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the United States or of the particular state
or territory.2 It may safely be asserted that the common law, as
it existed in England at the time of the settlement of the American colonies, has never been in force in all of its provisions in any
state of the United States. It has been adopted only to the extent
that its general principles were suited to the condition and habits
of the colonists, and in harmony with the spirit and objects of
American institutions. In Katz v. Walkinshaw,3 the court stated
'Morris v. Vanderen, i Dall. 64 (Pa. 1782); Commonwealth v. Lehigh

Valley R. Co., 165 Pa. 162 (1895); Conant v. Jordan, 107 Me.
Mathewson v. Phoenix Iron Foundry, 20 Fed. 281 (1884).

227 (1912);

*See Going v. Emery, 16 Pick. 107 (Mass. 1834) ; State v. Musick, 145
Mo. App. 33 (19io); Ferris v. Saxton, 4 N. J. Law, I (1I8); Waters v.
Gerard, 189 N. Y. 302 (19o7).
$141 CoL x6 (903).

NOTES

the doctrine to be as follows: "Whenever it is found that, owing to
the physical features and character of this state, and the peculiarities of its climate, soil, and production, the application of a given
common-law rule by our courts tends constantly to cause injustice
and wrong, rather than the administration of justice and right, then
the fundamental principles of right and justice on which that law is
founded, and which its administration is intended to promote, require that a different rule should be adopted, one which is calculated to secure persons in their property and possession, and to
preserve for them the fruits of their labors and expenditures."'
Among the many common-law rules rejected by our courts
on the theory that they were inconsistent with the conditions prevailing in the particular jurisdiction, the following may be regarded as typical: The rule as to the right of trial by wager of
law ;' the rule as to the allowance of the benefit of clergy;" the
rules respecting the exclusive establishment of the Church of England, and the ecclesiastical right to titles, oblations, and other
duties;- the theoretical unity of husband and wife;' the rules relating to the easements of ancient light and air;' and the rule that
a barrister or attorney cannot, by action, compel payment for his

services."
In considering any particular common-law rule, two diametrically opposed doctrines must be kept in mind. One is the general
principle expressed in the maxim that where the reason of a rule
ceased, the rule also ceased. On the other hand, it must be conceded
that whenever a principle of the common law has been clearly and
unquestionably recognized and established, the court must enforce
it, until it is repealed by the legislature, even though the reason,
in the opinion of the court, which induced its original establishment,
may have ceased to exist. If the latter doctrine were not recognized,
rules of law would be as unsettled and fluctuating as the personal
opinions of the different judges administering them might happen
to differ concerning the existence of sufficient reason for maintaining them."'
In the recent case of Ketclson v. Stilz et al.,12 the Supreme

'See also Williams v. Miles, 68 Neb. 463 (1903); Luhrs v. Hancock, 181

U. S. s67 ('go').

'Childress v. Emory, 8 Wheat. 642 (1823).
'Fuller v. State, i Blackf. 63 (Ind. i82o).
'Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch 292 (185).
'Jones v. Clifton, ioi U. S. 225 (x879).
'Haverstick v. Sipe, 33 Pa. 368 (1859).
' Stevens v. Adams, 23 Wend. 56 (N. Y. i84o).
"Meng v. Coffee, 67 Neb. Soo (I9o3); Powell v. Branden,
(852).
32 I1 N. E. 423 (Ind. I916).
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Court of Indiana considered the applicability of an established rule
of the English common law to the conditions prevailing in Indiana.
It is the well-settled law in England, since the case of Brown v.
WVooton,' 3 that a judgment, although it is not satisfied, may be
pleaded in bar in an action for the same cause brought against
another as a joint tort-feasor. The great majority of American
courts have held that nothing short of full satisfaction of a former
judgment in tort can be a bar to an action against a joint tortfeasor who was not a party to the first judgment.1 ' The Indiana
court refused to approve the English rule, although the legislature
of that state expressly provided: "The law governing this state
is declared to be . . . the common law of England, and statutes
of the British Parliament made in aid thereof prior to the reign
of the James the First [excepting certain enactments] which are of
a general nature, not local to that kingdom." The court in reaching
its conclusion said: "No rule of the common law could survive
the reason on which it was founded.
. . It seems reasonable
to hold that the injured party should be entitled to one compensation, and no good reason has been suggested to show why an ineffectual attempt to collect judgment rendered against one of several
joint tort-feasors should operate to bar further proceedings against
another who is jointly liable."
While it is unquestionable that the court may properly reject
a common-law rule if it is inconsistent with the spirit of American
institutions and repugnant to the modern idea of justice, it is equally
well settled that the power to declare a rule of the common law inapplicable should be used sparingly. Legislative repeal is the ordinary remedy to be utilized when an established rule of the common
law is found to be undesirable; it is only the exceptional case that
permits of the drastic remedy of judicial abrogation of a settled rule
of the common law.
L.R.L.

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW -

POLICE

POWER -

RAILROAD

PASSES

-During the midle and latter half of the nineteenth century, it became a well-known custom for railroads to issue passes to public
officials of the state. This was recognized as an evil and was dealt
with by statute in many jurisdictions. Pennsylvania, for example,
did what would seem to be the natural thing and provided that no
railway should grant free passes to any person except officers or
Cro. Jac. 73, Yelv. 68 f., (Eng. 16o6). Accord, Bushland v. Johnson, 15
145 (Eng. 1954); Brinsmead v. Harrison, L R. 7 C. P. 547

C. B.

(Eng. 1872).

"Blackman v. Simpson, 58 L. 1. A. 410 (Mich.
'Constitution of 1874, Art. x7, Sec. &

1899).

NOTES

employees of the company.' Likewise, Congress prohibited the
issuance of free passes except to certain specified persons not including public officials. 2 In Nebraska, it was made a misdemeanor
for a railroad to issue, or for any person, with a few exceptions,
to accept, a free ticket.' New Jersey, however; dealt with this
matter differently than most of the other states and the steadfast
purpose of the legislature in that state has been to make passes
compulsory rather than to prohibit them. This was done, at first,
by provisions in the railway charters that certain heads of state departments should be carried free of charge. Then the General Railroad Act of 1873 provided that certain state officials should be carried free, but this applied only to railroads incorporated under the
Act. This was followed by the Act of 1911, which provided that
certain designated officials, about for hundred in all and including
the Governor and members of the legislature during their variods
respective terms of office, should pass and repass free of charge on
all railroads now or hereafter operated in New Jersey.'
The validity of the New Jersey Act of 1911 has been discussed
in two recent cases, the alleged invalidity being a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. In D. L. & W.
R. R. Co. v. Public Utilities Board, a member of the State Water
Supply Commission sought to sustain his right to travel free of
charge under the act but it was held that the act as applied to him
was unconstitutional as it deprived the railroad of due process of
law.' In a more recent case, it was held that the Secretary of the
Governor was entitled to transportation free of charge and that the
act as applied to him was not in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." It was pointed out by the court that the harm resulting from
the custom of the railroads to give passes to public officials was in
the impression made upon the public mind, which looked with disfavor upon this practice which placed those in charge of the government tinder obligations to the railroads, and that the policy of the
New Jersey Legislature had been to remove the element of gratuity
by making the transportation obligatory upon the railroads. In
passing upon the constitutionality of the act with regard to these
different officials, the test adopted by the court was that if the official
in question held a position where his favor might be advantageous
or his disfavor detrimental to the railways, the act requiring the
railway to transport such an official did not work a deprivation of
property without due process of law, for the act in such a case
would be a police regulation, to carry out the policy of the legislature.
'Act February 4, 1887, c. 1o4, Sec. i, as amended; Act June 2, 9o6,
c 3591, Sec. z; Act April 13, 1908, c. 143, and Act June 18, 19io, c. 3o9.
"Cobbey's Comp. Stat., Sees. zo664-bo665.
'N. J. Laws of 1911, Chap. z29.
185 N. J. L 28 (1913).
' Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Herrmann, 96 Atl. 665 (igm6).
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In the earlier New Jersey case, t the court cited Charlotte, Columbia & Augusta R. R. Co. v. Gibbes ' as nearly in point. This
case sustained as constitutional a statute requiring the salaries and
expenses of the State Railroad Commission to be borne by the
several railroads within the state. But it is submitted that this statute was sustained as an exercise of the taxing power in the nature
of a local assessment. The court indicated clearly that if the tax
were levied to pay for services in no way connected with the railways, there would be a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. No
attempt was made to sustain the New Jersey Act as a revenueraising measure, "for obvious reasons" said the court.
Although, in the exercise of the police power, the means to be
employed are primarily within the discretion of the legislature, it
would seem that the means adopted by the New Jersey Legislature
in casting upon the railways the duty of carrying about four hundred persons without compensation, whether in pursuance of their
official duties or pleasure, approaches very closely to an arbitrary
abuse of its discretion and consequently not a valid exercise of the
police power, for while it is true that a state can compel uncompensated obedience to a valid exercise of its police power without
violating the Fourteenth Amendment, such a regulation must have a
substantial relation to the end to be accomplished.'
Moreover, it would seem that the evil of this custom of giving
passes was deeper than the mere unfavorable impression upon the
public mind. It is submitted that if this New Jersey legislation is
valid as an exercise of the police power, it would be an equally
valid police regulation for the legislature to provide that the railways should transport doctors or clergymen free of charge.10 In
Interstate Railway Company v. Aassachusetts," Mr. Justice Holmes,
speaking for himself alone, "hesitatingly agreed" that to require thrailroads to carry school zhildren at half price might be justified under the police power saying that "structural habits count for as much
as logic in drawing the line" and stating that a like favor upon
doctors or workingmen might not be equally valid.
The validity of the New Jersey Act of i91i was also sustained,
in the cases supra, as an exercise of the reserved right of the
legislature to alter the charters of the corporations, which *this
discussion does not purport to treat.
R.H. W.
'D., L. & W. R. R. Co. v. Public Utilities Board, supra.
'142 U. S. 386 0890.
'Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Omaha, 235 U. S. 121 (1914).
" N. J. v. Sutton, 83 N. J. L 46 (197). Act requiring street railways
to transport policemen free of charge while engaged in their public duties
was held constitutional as a valid exercise of the police power. Contra,
Wilson v. United Traction Co., 72 N. Y. App. Div. 223 (1902).
"207 U. S. 79 (1907):

NOTES
INSt'R.AXCE-\\'VT CONSTITUTES A.% Acc1DI:NTr?-Policies of

accident insurance as a rule cover only death or disability which
happens as the result of "external, violent, and accidental means.."
The inquiry arises as to when the cause of an injury is to be considered as accidental, that is, what is the proper construction of
the term "accidental means," as used in insurance policies of this
nature.
The best definition of the term is given by the United States
Supreme Court in these words: "The term accidental is used in
its ordinary sense as meaning 'happening by chance, unexpectedly
taking place, not according to the usual cause of things'; that if a
result is such as follows from ordinary means, voluntarily employed, in a not unusual or unexpected way, it cannot be called a
result effected by accidental means; but that if, in the act which
precedes the injury, something unforeseen, unexpected, unusual occurs which produces the injury, then the injury has resulted thr6ugh
accidental means."' So the rule is well established that an accident
policy does not insure against an injury that is caused by a voluntary, natural, ordinary movement executed as intended. 2 The
courts look not to the resultant injury merely, but to the means
producing that result. The injury must not only be unusual and
unexpected, but the cause itself must have been unexpected and accidental.3 However, it is the application of this rule to the varyings kinds of accidental injuries which is sometimes involved in confusion, occasioning, in some instances, divergent opinions by the
courts.

Insurance companies seek to protect themselves from fraud
by inserting a condition requiring that the accident be caused by
external and violent means. The courts have construed this phrase
to mean that the cause of the injury must be external, though the
injury itself acts internally. Thus, choking to death over food,4
drowning," asphyxiation, and poisoning,' are held to be external
forces which operate internally to produce death. Likewise, the
courts seem to be agreed in holding that a previous diseased condition will prevent liability for death or injury from accident,
especially where the policy specifies accidental injury "independ'Mutual Accident Ass'n v. Barry, 131 U. S. oo (x889).
'Stone v. Fidelity & Cas. Co, 182 S. W. 252 (Tenn. z16).
'Feder v. Iowa St. Traveling Men's Ass'n, 107 Iowa, 538 (1899); In re
Scarr (i9o5), i K. B. 367; Smith v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 219 Mass. 147
(19,4).

'American Ace. Co. v. Reigart, 94 Ky. 547 (1893).
'United States Mut. Ass'n v. Hubbell, 56 Ohio St. 516 (1897).
'Pickett v. Pacific Mut. Co., z44 Pa. 79 0890 ; Paul v. Travelers' Ins.
Co., II2 N. Y. 472 (889).

' Healey v. Mutual Ass'n, x33 11. 556- (t89o).
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ently of all other causes."' But when the accident causes a
disease which hastens death, recovery will not be denied.' So far
the courts are in accord.
The point upon which the decisions are apparently irreconcilable is this: When a voluntary and intentional movement results in
a strain or internal disorder, is it an accident within the purview
of the iiisurance policy? In a recent decision in Tennessee, Stone
v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., ° the insured while sick in bed, reached
for a paper and raised it suddenly above his head, when his strong
blood pressure caused a rupture of the retina and destroyed the
sight of one eye. The court held this not to be an injury through
"accidental means," for, while the result was not foreseen, the
cause producing the result was not accidental but was an ordinary
natural movement, executed as intended. The basis of the decision
is that the cause of injury itself must have been unexpected and
accidental. If the alleged cause was a natural and ordinary movement, and there was no slipping or stumbling, the resulting injury
was not produced by accidental means."
However, there are numerous decisions which seem directly
opposed to this statement and which have held that, although a
natural and ordinary act is done intentionally, if the resulting injury is unexpected and unforeseen and does not follow naturally
from the act but in an unusual and unexpected way, it is an accidental injury.12 It is possible to reconcile some of the cases
upon the theory that injuries resulting from acts which are exactly
what the insured intended and which are unaccompanied by any
intentional or involuntary muscular effort are not caused by "accidental means"; but so caused when the insured's acts bringing about
the injury is accompanied by an unanticipated and unintentional
movement or circumstance.13
An interesting question is involved in another recent case of
sunstroke. Two early decisions had held that a sunstroke was to
be classified as a disease rather than as an accident and therefore
no liability resulted," unless it was expressly included as one of
"Stanton v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 83 Conn. 708 (igio); Maryland Cas.
599 (914); Crandall v. Continental Cas. Co., i79

Co. v. Morrow, 213 Fed.
Ill. App. 330 (1913).
'Rathjen

v. Woodmen Acc. Ass'n,

v. Standard Ins. Co., 158 N. C.
"182

141

N. IV. 815 (Neb. 1913); Penn

29 (1gx).

S. W. 252 (Tenn. zx16).

"Shanberg

v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 143 Fed. 651 (1905); Smouse v.

Iowa S. & Traveling Men's Ass'n, 118 Iowa 436 (19o2); Lehman v. Great
Western Ace. Ass'n, x33 N. W. 752 (Iowa igir).
"Mutual Ace. Ass'n v. Barry, supra; Taylor v. General Ac. Corp., 2o8
Pa. 43.9 (i9o4); Young v. Railway Mail Ass'n, T--6 Mo. App. 325 (1907);

Patterson v. Ocean, etc., Corp, 25 App. D. C. 46 (r9o5).
SClidero v. Scottish Ac. Ins. Co., 1892, 29 Scot. L. R. 303; Hastings
v. Travelers' Ins. Co., xgo Fed. 258 (1911) ; Fuller, Accident Insurance, 30.
"Sinclair v. Maritime Co., 3 Ellis & Ellis, 478 (Eng. 1861); Dozier v.
Fidelity & Cas. Co., 46 Fed. 446 (z89i).

NOTES

tile insured castralties.'1 But in Bryant v. Continc tal Casualty
Co.,' 0 the Supreme Court of Texas reversed an earlier opinion and
held that a sunStroke is a form of i'ersonal injury. The policy in
that case expressly provided for the liability of the company "if
sunstroke, due to external, violent a d accidental means, shall result, independently of all other caus. s, in the death of the insured,"
so the question was wvhet'her one wvho had voluntarily placed hinself within the influence of the suns rays and had been overcome,
had suffered an injury due to external, violent, and accidental
means. The court said that a sunstroke was as clearly an accident
as was a lightning stroke.
In a New York case sunstroke has been regarded as an accident. 7 But in Pennsylvania Is and Indiana 19 the direct opposite
has been held, :iz., that sunstroke is a disease. The Pennsylvania
court has said that, since it is a disease there is no liability for sunstroke unless it is brought about by some concurring accident. The
Texas decision flatly refuses to follow this view, leaving the cases
irreconcilable.
P.H.R.

PROPERTY-PERPETUITIES--POWES.--IS THE DEGREE OF REMOTENESS OF THE ApPPOINTMENT MEASURED FROM TIE DATE OF
TIE CRE.ATIO-N OR OF TIHE EXERCISE OF TiE POWER?- WVhile the
general rule undoubtedly is that the remoteness of an appointment depends on its distance from the creation and not from the
exercise of the power,1 this rule has been universally applied only
to appointments made under special or particular powers. Appointments made under general powers whose exercise is unrestricted
have never been subject to the rule.
The last-named proposition has received attention from practically all the text writers. The ty-pical case is where the testator
devises a life estate, with power in the life tenant to appoint by
deed or -ill to whom he pleases. In applying the rule against
perpetuities to any appointment made under such a power, the date
of the making of the appointment is the starting point. The decisions of the courts have always been in accord with this rule, but
the question has very rarely been discussed in the opinion of the
court. One of the first cases to consider thoroughly the problem

" Continental Cas. Co. v. Johnson, 74 Kan.

129 (1906).
182 So. W. 6"-3 (Tex. 1916); revers-g 145 So. W. 636 (1912).
" Gallagher v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 148 X. Y. S. ioi6 (1914).
" Semancik v. Continental Cas. Co., 6 Pa. Super. Ct. 39W (1914).
"Elsey v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., zo9 X. E. 413 (Ind. 1915).
'Lewis, Pi'rpetuities, p. 488; Gray, R,,k- Against Perpetuities, Sees. 514,
515, et seq.
24
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and the underlying reasons was Mi in's Appeal,' a Pennsylvania
case decided in i888. In that case, the power was actially exercised by will. The court held that the donee of such a power was
to be regarded as the absolute owner of the property, so far as the
application of the rule against perpetuities was concerned.$
The real difficulty arises when the rule against perpetuities is
applied to an appointment made under a general power to be exercised by will only. A half dozen or more cases in England have
established two lines of authority which have generally been said
to be distinctly contrary.4
The one line of decisions, represented by the earlier cases, involves appointments made under powers created by marriage settlements. The typical case is where property is conveyed to trus-,
tees, to pay the income to the husband and wife during their lives,
and at the death of the survivor of them, to pay the principal to
the children of the marriage, in such shares as the husband shall
by will or deed appoint. The husband then appoints to a child for
life, remainder to whomsoever the child shall appoint by will. The
first case, Wollaston v. King,' decided that the appointment made
by the child under his father's will was void for remoteness. The
second case, Morgan v. Gronow,8 decided that the power of appointment conferred upon the child was void for remoteness.
The other line of cases, of which the principal one is Routs v.
Jackson,? involves appointments made under powers created by will.
The typical case is where the testator gives property to his wife
for life, with remainder to whomever his daughter shall by will
appoint. It was held, both in Rous v. Jackson I and in In re
Flower,8 which followed Rous v. Jackson, that, as to appointments
made under such a genera' testamentary power, the rule against
perpetuities ran from the date of the daughter's death, and not
from the date of the instrument creating the power. It is necesr21 Pa. 205.

"If Mrs. Mifflin had actually executed the power [during her lifetime]
and caused the title to be conveyed to herself in fee simple, as she had the
plain right to do, the limitations of her will would have to be determined
upon their own merits, regarding her as the owner in fel and disregarding
the previous state of the title. But so far as the application of the rule
2

against perpetuities is concerned, the situation is precisely the same as if

she had executed the power." Mifflin's Appeal, supra, note 2, at p. 224.
See also in accord, Bray v. Bree, 8 Bligh N. S. 568 (1834); Re Lawrence's
Estate, 136 Pa. 354 (i8go).
"See generally Gray, Perpetuities,Sees. 526, 526a, 526b.
I I. R. 8 Eq. i65 (869).
Lk R. 16 Eq. 1 (1873).

S2 Ch. D. 52

(x885).

55 1- J. (C.) 200 (iM8S).

NOTES

sary to note here In re Po-well's Trusts,g in which, on the same
facts, it was held that validity of the appointment was measured
from the date of the creation of the power. This case contains no
reference to either 'ollaston v. King,10 or Morgan v. Gronow,"
and was expressly stated in Rous v. Jackson," to have been wrongly
decided.
In attempting a distinction between these two lines of cases,
the reasons for the respective decisions should be noted. In Morgan
v. Gronow, 3 the court said, in speaking of the power given to the
daughter by the father's will: "If she had been living at the date
of the instrument creating the power, I should have thought that
was within the terms of the power. She was not, however, then
living, and inasmuch as nothing could vest in her, or her representative, or in any one else, under an exercise of the power, except at a time which might be beyond the limits allowed by the
rule as to perpetuities, not oniy lVollaston v. King, but principle,
obliges me to hold that that is void." In Rous v. Jackson, 4 the
court held as follows: "Lord St. Leonards in his work on Powers,
says :15 'A general power is, in regard to the estates which may
be created by force of it, tantamount to a limitation in fee, not
merely because it enables the donee to limit a fee, which a particular power may also do, but because it enables him to give the
fee to whom he pleases.' IIe draws no distinction between a power
exercisable by deed or will or by will only, and it appears to me
to make no difference by what instrument the power is made exercisable."'"
The cases upholding the appointments have said not that this
general power of appointment by will is a fee, but that it is equivalent to a fee for the purpose of the application of the rules of perpetuities to appointments made under it. In the second line of
cases, the power itself is good, as it must be exercised at the termination of a life in being at the time of the creation of the power,
i. c., the death of the original testator's daughter. Hence a valid
life estate plus a valid power of appointment by will might well be
regarded as a fee. But in the first class of case, the power itself is
void, because it might be exercised more than twenty-one years
after a life in being at the time of the marriage settlement; it is to
be exercised at the death of the daughter, who was unborn when the
settlement was made and the original power created. Realizing this
639 L.J.(Ch.) i88 (x869).
"Supra, note s"Supra, note 6."
'Supra, note 1.
"Supra, note 6, at p. 9.
"Supra, note 7, at p. 526.
8th Ed., 394.
See also Butler's, Coke on Littleton, 2,72a.
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distinction, how can it be argued that a valid life estate plus a void
power of appointment are equivalent to a fee so as to make valid,
as regards the rule against perpetuities, an appointment made under
a power which is itself void?
The existence of a valid distinction between these two lines of
authority is strengthened by two Irish cases, decided in i891 and
I900, by the same Vice-Chancellor, the Right Honorable Hedges
Chatterton, who decided the two cases differently, the facts being
similar to Wallaston v. King 17 and Rous v. Jackson,8 respectively.
Stuart v. Babington,1" similar upon its facts to Rous v. Jackson, was
decided in accordance therewith, and In re Powcll's Trusts,2 was
disapproved of; Wollaston v. King and Morgan v. Gronow were
neither cited by counsel nor mentioned in the opinion.2
Tredcnnick
v. Trcdcnnick,22 similar in facts to Wollaston v. King, expressly
follows that case, although Stuart v. Babington 23 was cited to the
court by counsel.
This problem has recently arisen in Pennsylvania in Hazard's
Estate.4 In that case, X, by will gave land to A for life, then in
trust for B for life, remainder as B should by will appoint; in case
of B's intestacy, to B's children. B, by will, gave the property to
C for life, then to D for life, remainder to D's children. The court,
following the decision in In re Powell's Trusts 23 and the conclusion reached by Mr. Gray in his RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES,2 6
held that B's life estate plus the power of appointment by will was
"Supra, note 5"'Supra,note 7.
" 27 Ir. L R. 551 (z89i).
*Supra, note 9.
' Stuart v. Babington, supra, note ig,on p. 556: "The difficulty in the

case arises from the ambiguous use of the relative words, 'general power'
and 'particular power'. The words 'general power' are sometimes used to
mean a power to appoint, which the donee is free to exercise by deed or
will, as distinguished from a particular power which the donee can only
exercise in whichever of those two ways is prescribed by the power. In
other cases the expression 'general power' is used with reference to the
objects of the power, where the donee may appoint to anyone, and is

contradistinguished from a particular or special power where the objects

are confined to a particular class. The consideration whether a power is
general or special, in reference to the question of remoteness, can, in my
opinion, only apply when the words are employed in. this latter and more
proper use of these terms. The doctrine of remoteness does not apply to
cases like the present, whether the power be exercisable by deed only or
by will only.

The true distinction depends on the question whether the

objects of the power are general or speciaL"
3t Ir. Rep. [1goo], 354.
"Supra, note 19.
25 D. R. 226 (I9j5).
U Supra, note
.
"Sees.
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not equivalent to a fee, and hence that all devises must be judged
as of the date of X's death in regard to remoteness, that the remainder to D's children was bad, and that D got a fee simple, his
life estate under B's will, and his remainder, in case of intestacy,
under X's will, merging. The decision was based directly upon the
dictum found in Laurence's Estate," which is based upon In re
Potell's Trusts, and upon Boyd's Estate (No. i ),' which seems to
be based upon Laurence's Estate.
P. C. IV.
REAL ESTATE BROKERs-RIGHT TO A Co,,% tMSSON-Although
the business of a real estate broker is of comparatively recent origin,
yet it is surprising to note the great number of cases, that have
arisen during the last quarter of a century, which involve the relation of principal and broker in respect to real estate transactions.
As might be expected, most of the adjudicated cases deal with a
real estate broker's right to a commission and under what circumstances he is entitled to one.
In general, to entitle a broker to a commission, he must be
able to show that he was actually employed by his principal, either
expressly or impliedly, as mere voluntary services, rendered in the
hope that there may be compensation afterward given, are not
sufficient to entitle him to recover.' It must also appear that the
services of the broker were the efficient cause of the contract of sale
having been made, and this may be shown by merely proving that
it was brought about by an introduction of the property to the
buyer, either by an advertisement or by any other services.
If
the services rendered do not result in a contract between the principal and the other party then, in the absence of any contrary provision in his contract, the broker is not entitled to any compensation, because he takes the chance that there may be no result from
such services 3 But if the broker has fully performed his undertaking by producing a person, who is ready and able to purchase
or lease his employer's property upon the terms stipulated, then his
right to a commission is not defeated by an arbitrary refusal of the
owner to consummate the transaction.'
However, as a broker occupies a quasi fiduciary relation to'his
employer, he is bound to act in good faith in his dealings with h;m
and to make a full disclosure of all material facts which might

Dx36 Pa. 354 (189o).
xgg Pa. 487 (19om).
'Holmes v. Neafie, z51 Pa. 392 (t892).
'Earp v. Cummins, S4 Pa. 394 (1867).
*Pierce v. Truitt, 21 V. N. C. 569 (Pa.
'Kifer v. Yoder, 198 Pa. 3o8"(9oi).
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affect the action of his employer in the premises. If a broker intentionally conceals such facts from his principal, then the latter
is justified in refusing to carry out his part of the agreement and
the former will be deprived of his right to a commission.' One of
the most interesting situations, in cases of this kind, occurs when
the name of the real purchaser of the land is concealed and the
name of a ficticious person is substituted. In such cases this fact
may or may not be material, depending upon the particular circumstances.
In a recnt case, where the tirms on which the sale was to be
negotiated called for one-half the price in cash, and a mortgage
for the remainder, it was held that the employer was entitled to
know who the purchaser was. It has also been held that such concealment and substitution will preclude the recovery of commissions if the principal suffered, any injury thereby. So, where a
broker concealed the name of the real purchaser and substituted
the name of a person of'straw at the instance of the real purchaser,
who hoped thereby to obtain a better bargain, the principal was
justified in breaking off the negotiations on discovering the deception practised upon- him. 7 And where a broker, who claimed
he had sold his principal's property for the stipulated price and
had received part of the purchase price as earnest money, tendered
a receipt for the same, made out in his name instead of that of the
purchaser, it was held that the owner might refuse to sell without
becoming liable for commissions, on the ground that the broker was
himself the purchaser..
But where the principal has no interest in the financial responsibility of the purchaser and the identity of the latter is in no way
related to the amount of the purchase price, then the concealment
of the identity of the latter will'not preclude a broker from recovering his commission on a sale of the land.' Accordingly, where
the conveyance was made to a third person at the instance of the
real purchaser, who did not wish to give his notes for certain
deferred payments, and the owner had received in full the price
asked for the land, which was all it was worth at the time of the
sale, the court held that the vendor was not prejudiced in any way.
However, it has been held that an arrangement between a real
purchaser and a broker, whereby a third person is held out to the
principal as the ostensible purchaser, is contrary to public policy,
and so recovery of commissions should not be allowed, although
'Pratt v. Patterson,

112

Pa. 475 -(886)..

'Coppage Y. Howard, 96 At. 64z (Md. xsi6).
'Wilkinson v. McCullough, z96 Pa. 205 (goo).
*.Hayden v. GriUo, 35 Mo. App. 647 (z889).

'Veasey v. Carson, 177 Mass. I17, 53 L R. A. 241 (goo).
Reich v. Workman, 161 S. W. z8o (Ark. 1913).
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no injury might result to the principal."0 This reasoning is erroneous, it is submitted, in that it lays stress upon the idea of
public policy, rather than looking at the question from its practical
aspect. If the principal is in no way prejudiced and receives what
his property is actually worth, then it should be immaterial whether
the person, introduced to the principal, is the real purchaser or
merely a straw man.
In some jurisdictions a broker doing business without a license, required by statute or ordinance, is not entitled to any compensation for his services,"' but in others such a statute or ordinance
will not prevent a broker from suing for a commission earned, as
the necessity of a license is considered a question between the state
or city and the licensee, with which third persons are not concerned.1 2 While Pennsylvania is in accord with the former view,"0
yet a commission on a sale of zeal estate.may be received in the
absence of a license, if it can be shown that the contract was a
special one for the sale of a particular piece of real estate, entered
into by one who did not hold himself out to the world as a real
estate broker.1 '
David Reeves Henry.*
Hafner v. Herron, 165 Ill.
242 (xg).
v. Collot, 46 Ill. App. 36t (1892).
" Prince v. Baptist Church, 2o Mo. App. 332 (1886).
"Luce v. Cook, 227 Pa. 224 (IgIo).
"Woods v. Derron, 229 Pa. 62S (xgt).

'Eckert

*This note was prepared by Mr. Henry just prior to his death, notice of
which occurs elsewhere in this issue.--n.

